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Abstract 
The research aimed to provide answer as to how power dynamics of the various actors 
influence the water management of the Rift Valley Basin. The overall aim is met 
through answering in what way do: 1) private sector, 2) smallholders, and 3) 
government officials play a role in the water management of the Rift Valley Basin?” 
and utilising the analytical power of concepts such as institutional bricolage, 
structural power and boundary organisations, all under the umbrella of a political 
ecology study. By analysing two districts in the regional state of Oromiya, it has 
utilised a case study and constructivist approach. Data collection was done through 
semi-structured interviews as well as desk reviews. The main findings are: first, 
through institutional bricolage it is evident that differences in scale and levels 
contribute to differing worldviews between actors. Second, knowledge-creation is 
shaped by economic-political interests in the Basin as analysed in boundary 
organisation concept. Lastly, it can be concluded that smallholders are the least to 
influence, whereas similarities in interests between the government and the private 
sector make the maintenance of power easier through controlled participation and 
knowledge dissemination to other actors. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Water is the source of life. Consequently, the physical and social characteristics of 
water management are interdependent (Ison, Röling, & Watson, 2007). Humans 
conceptualise different ways of understanding water, making management consist of a 
wide variety of values, knowledge, and perspectives in a collaborative and 
participatory decision making process (von Korff, Daniell, Moellenkamp, Bots, & 
Bijlsma, 2012, p. 1). The words ‘collaborative’ and ‘participatory’, in turn, entail 
multiple perspectives and stakeholders which can increase both connectedness, and 
also complexity, uncertainty and conflict (Ison et al., 2007). They are even called the 
‘messes’ or ‘wicked problems’ especially in the public policy sphere (von Korff et al., 
2012, p. 1). Therefore, the multiplicity and complexity of actors and perspectives 
make studies of water management very challenging from the economic, sociological 
and political point of view. 
 
Water governance and its management is an inherently political subject in the sense 
that they involve conflicts in the allocation, and in general the use of an increasingly 
scarce and valuable resource (Araral & Wang, 2013, p. 3952). The Rift Valley Basin 
in Ethiopia
1
 provides such a stage where various actors, and their diverse interests and 
interactions on water management come into play. Home to around 11 million people, 
the Basin serves not only the livelihoods of the local communities, such as irrigation 
for small holders, water for livestock, and fishing; but also the existence of various 
economic and political interests, i.e. floriculture and horticulture companies, and 
interests of two administrative regional states (GIRDC, 2010a, p. 10; Pascual-Ferrer, 
Candela, Pérez-Foguet, & Kebede, n.d.). This coupled with pervasive water 
degradation that is both man-made and natural in the area make the water 
management issues even more complex and challenging in this region (Hengsdijk, 
Van Driel, Haile, Argaw, & Jansen, n.d.).  
 
The issue of the ‘human’ management of a water basin therefore, comprises of many 
layers of social, political and economic institutions, various types of users and various 
                                                        
1 The Rift Valley Basin in Ethiopia is also called the Central Rift Valley (CRV) Basin, denoting its central location 
in the East African Rift; or the Rift Valley Lakes Basin, denoting the presence of many lakes in the Basin. In this 
study, I use the first name (Rift Valley Basin) for simplicity and uniformity’s sake. 
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type of water usage and allocation, as well as levels of governance and regulatory 
framework (Berger, Birner, McCarthy, Díaz, & Wittmer, 2006). This complexity 
provides an arena for power relations to be exercised between actors whom all have 
high stakes and interests in the resource. Such a case thus requires looking into the 
concept of power, and politics as an exercise of power, in relations to environmental 
change and management (Garcia-Lopez, 2009, p. 23). The purpose of this qualitative 
study is therefore to explore and contribute to knowledge regarding power relations 
between the different actors (i.e. smallholders, private sector, the public sector, 
academia, donor, and civil societies) and institutional arrangements, that are involved 
in the water management of a common pool resource
2
 located in the Rift Valley 
Lakes Basin.  
 
The overall aim of this thesis is to “investigate how power dynamics of the various 
actors influence the management of water of the Rift Valley Basin.” The overall aim 
is met as we provide answers to the questions of the roles of the three biggest actors in 
the RV-Basin, In what ways do the:  1) private sector, 2) smallholders and the civil 
societies, and 3) government officials shape the water management of the Basin? The 
study employs a case–study approach from a constructivist standpoint and relies on 
data from desk reviews and fieldwork from two districts in the Oromiya regional state 
of Ethiopia. The study is conceptualized with the analytical power of concepts such as 
institutional bricolage, structural power and boundary organization - under the 
umbrella of a political ecology. 
 
Literature on the Rift Valley Basin mostly focuses on physical conditions in a 
temporal sense, smallholders and their livelihoods, as well as agricultural production 
analysis. At the same time, studies on institutional arrangements and power relations 
looking through the lenses of a post-institutionalist, multi-level analysis are few. My 
original contribution to this field of knowledge is to fill this gap in the empirical and 
theoretical literature - through this institutional study that addresses power relations 
amongst actors at various level, focusing on the dynamics in an economically, 
                                                        
2 Commons are natural resources that are accessible to all parts of society, and thus held in common, such as air, 
and earth. Common pool resources (CPRs), on the other hand, are systems that generate finite quantities of 
resource units (e.g. water) so that one person's use subtracts from the quantity of resource units available to others 
(Cleaver, 2002). They have characteristic of both public goods and private goods problems: free riding problem 
and problems on governance and management of appropriations, respectively (Ostrom, 2002, p. 1317). Ostrom 
further notes that irrigation systems are the most important types of CPRs (Ostrom, 1990, pp. 21-33). 
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environmentally, and politically sensitive common pool resource such as the Rift 
Valley Basin.
 
 I focus on two operational areas
3
 – two representative upper-stream 
districts from the Rift Valley Basin to discuss that water as a resource transcends 
(administrative) boundaries. These two districts represent the whole Basin in the 
holistic sense: they are both small to medium size towns, have agriculture production 
as the mainstay, and possess similar socio-economic and socio-demographic 
background as the rest of the Basin. I also specifically focus on the use of surface 
water for agricultural purposes (i.e. irrigation and livestock water supply) vis-à-vis the 
research questions.  
 
The rest of the thesis is organised as follows: The second chapter provides 
information on the background case study. The third chapter brings the literature 
review, and guides the reader through the concepts and themes used in the thesis. The 
fourth chapter presents the framework, and how it is applied in the analysis section. 
The fifth chapter outlines the methodology of the study, research design as well as its 
strength and weakness. It further discusses the reliability and validity aspects, and 
processes of data collection and analysis. The sixth chapter explores the analysis. 
Finally, the seventh and final chapter concludes and presents recommendation for 
future research. 
2. BACKGROUND 
There are several issues pertaining to stakeholders’ views and institutional dynamics 
in a water basin. This section provides a detailed overview of these issues, relating to 
how water basin is managed in Ethiopia, including the existing policy and legal 
framework, as well as context on the Rift Valley Basin as well as the various efforts 
to manage it. I start off the section by providing the following general information 
about how water basin is managed in Ethiopia 
2.1. Water basin management in Ethiopia 
Water is a critical resource in Ethiopia, the second most populous country in Africa.  
It is endowed with 12 river basins with an annual runoff volume of 122 billion m
3
 of 
water, which makes an average of 1575 m
3
 of physically available water per person 
                                                        
3 Operational area is a translation of (abstract) concepts into (measurable) variables. It is also selected as places 
where the social phenomena are indicators of the social concepts used in this paper (Ostrom, 2002). 
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per year, well above the universally accepted scarcity threshold of 1000m
3
 
(Awulachew et al., 2007; ODI, 2015). Although abundant, the calculation does not 
take into account the spatial and temporal distribution, nor quality of the water (ODI, 
2015). In fact, in 2002-2003 Ethiopia faced a major drought, which led to famine and 
massive decline in its real GDP growth (Mwanakatwe & Barrow, 2010). 
 
As a consequence water management is vital in the country. Water planning in 
Ethiopia recognizes river basins as hydrological boundaries for planning unit and 
water resources management domain. This includes allocation and apportionment 
aspects (Ministry of Water, 2001).
4
 The map below shows the 12 basin boundaries of 
Ethiopia. 
 
Figure 1 Map of Ethiopia’s 12 river basins 
 
Source: Gandhi (2015a) 
 
To illustrate the importance, water is regulated up from the constitutional level down 
until strategy level. Water and other natural resources are regulated in the 1995 
                                                        
4 Granted, river basins are often advocated in water governance discourse as the most logical unit for water 
resources planning and optimum utilization of available water resources, as they involve various dynamics that 
transcends beyond engineering concept (Harvey, 2012-15). 
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Constitution of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia. It stipulates that all 
natural resources (including water) are the common property of the Ethiopian people 
(article 44) (ODI, 2015). It is operationalized in the 2010-2015 quinquennial plan 
called the Growth and Transformation Plan (GTP) that sets to make irrigated land 
area a six-fold increase and to quadruple hydropower generation capacity by 2015 
(ODI, 2015, p. 3). Specifically regarding water policies, there are the Ethiopian Water 
Resources Management Policy (2001) and the 2002 Water Sector Strategy, which has 
integrated principles of Integrated Water Resources Management (IWRM) and basin 
planning. The provisions of the water policies include basin planning, stakeholder 
participation and the user plays principles. It further stated the need to balance social, 
economic and environmental objectives (ODI, 2015). Another important document is 
the Water Sector Development Programme (WSDP 2002-2016) that provides a 
strategy for Ethiopia for water resources management and development. The last 
important document is the 2007 Proclamation on establishing River Basin Authorities 
(RBAs) to “promote and monitor the integrated resources management process in the 
river basins falling under their jurisdictions […]”.  
 
Table 1 highlights these policies. From this three basin councils were established, 
including the Rift Valley Lakes Basin Authority (No. 235/2011) (Ibid.). There are 
also Master Plans for various water basins in Ethiopia, among which the Master Plan 
of Rift Valley Lakes Basin. Description of the regulatory framework is important to 
highlight the fact that water basins, especially the Rift Valley Basin, are managed by 
law in Ethiopia. These regulations further show that the government take into account 
stakeholder participation and IWRM, of which are analysed in the later section. 
 
Table 1 Summary of water policies and directives regarding the Rift Valley 
Basin 
No. Policy document Year Content 
1 Constitution of the 
Federal Democratic 
Republic of Ethiopia 
1995 Article 44: All natural resources 
(including water) are the common 
property of the Ethiopian people 
2 Growth and 
Transformation Plan 
Quinquennial 
(currently 
Sets to make irrigated land area a 
six-fold increase and a quadrupling 
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2010-2015) of hydropower generation capacity 
until 2015 
3 Water Resources 
Management Policy 
2001 Included the principles of IWRM and 
basin planning 
4 Water Sector and 
Basin Planning 
2002 Included the principles of IWRM and 
basin planning 
5 Water Sector 
Development 
Program 
2002-2016 Provides strategy for Ethiopian water 
resources management and 
development 
6 Proclamation on 
Establishing River 
Basin Authorities 
(RBAs) 
2007 Promotion and monitoring of the 
integrated resources management 
process in the river basins falling 
under their jurisdictions 
7 Master plan of Rift 
Valley Lakes Basin 
2010 Containing water use, allocation and 
rights of the Basin 
8 Proclamation 
235/2011 
2011 The creation of Rift Valley Lakes 
Basin Authority (RVLBA) 
Source: GIRDC (2010a); ODI (2015) 
 
2.2. Rift Valley Basin 
This section provides description of the specific Basin, as well as the two districts on 
which the research is based. Ethiopia’s Rift Valley Basin (henceforth called the RV-
Basin) is located along the East African Rift that spans from the north of Ethiopia to 
Mozambique in the south. In Ethiopia, it is shared administratively by two regions: 
Oromiya and the Southern Nations, Nationalities and Peoples (SNNP) Region as can 
be seen in Figure 2 below. The RV-Basin is dominated by rain-fed, mixed crop-
livestock agriculture. The RV-Basin is characterized by arid and semiarid climatic 
conditions and a rapidly growing population (Tesfaye, 2008). The centre of the RV-
Basin is located 120 km south of Addis Ababa, Ethiopia’s capital city, and it is 
characterized by an alternating topography between 1500–1700 m above sea level 
(a.s.l.) in the central valley floor and at 4000 m a.s.l. in its western and eastern 
escarpments (Jansen et al., 2007). Its annual rainfall distribution is a bi-modal pattern. 
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Crop production, mainly rainfed cereal-based production systems (teff, maize and 
wheat) and modest livestock rearing are the mainstays of livelihoods for households 
in the Basin (Kassie et al., 2013, p. 59). Presentation of these characteristics is 
important to highlight how social and biophysical traits of the case study area are 
similar to whole RV-Basin. 
 
Figure 2 Map of the Rift Valley Basin spanning between Oromiya and SNNP 
regions 
 
Source: Gandhi (2015b) 
 
Lake Zeway and the surrounding area form the centre of the Basin. For this study, I 
look at two district-level towns called Adami Tulu Jido Kombolcha (ATJK) and 
Dugda, and their surface water source: the river of Meki, Lake Zeway and Bulbula 
river. The map below shows the study sites: five kebeles
5
 in Dugda woreda and six 
kebeles in ATJK, as well as where the rivers and lake are located within the localities. 
 
                                                        
5 Districts or woreda are the third-level administrative divisions of Ethiopia. They are composed of a number of 
wards (kebele) or neighborhood associations, which are the smallest unit of local government in Ethiopia. 
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Figure 3 Map of study sites/kebeles in the woredas of Dugda and Adami Tulu 
Jido Kombolcha
6
 
 
Source: Gandhi (2015c) 
 
                                                        
6 Please note that the coordinates for Meki and Bulbula rivers are approximation combined from several existing 
maps 
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Dugda woreda has a surface area of 1468 km
2
 (Beshir, 2004). In this woreda flows 
the Meki river and also the Zeway lake. Every farmer there has very small portion of 
land, which covers only 0.25 ha. They grow cabbage, onion, tomatoes, green beans, 
maize, papaya and fruits (i.e. high value crops) (Interview GO1, 2015). The woreda 
irrigation potential is substantial; from the lake 33%, the river 22% and 45% for 
groundwater (Ibid.). 
 
ATJK woreda is an adjacent district and has a similar demography and geography. It 
has 1403.25 km
2
 of surface area (Beshir, 2004). It is dominated by the Oromo ethnic 
group. The topography of the woreda is relatively flat ranging from 1500-2300 m 
a.s.l. It is characterized by low annual rainfall (750 mm). The farming system is 
entirely cereal-based and most farmers are food insecure (Adimassu, 2012). Usually 
farmers in this woreda also have irrigated plots along with mostly rain-fed system. 
The woreda consists of 38 kebeles (Tesfaye, 2008).  
 
Based on the Population projection from the May 2007 National Population and 
Housing Census of Ethiopia, total population in 2015 for Dudga woreda is 185,534, 
whereas ATJK counts 177,390 (CSA, 2012). The urban-rural ratio are 1:2.5 and 1:4.8 
respectively, denoting a largely rural population (CSA, 2013). Population density in 
2012 is calculated as 183,6 and 150.1 respectively, which can be said relatively low 
(CSA, 2012). From the descriptions above, we can see that the two woredas are quite 
similar in their demography and topography to the rest of the RV-Basin, as described 
in earlier paragraphs. 
 
The Rift Valley lakes and rivers constitute as one of the most biodiverse areas in 
Ethiopia (GIRDC, 2010a). The water resources are used for water supply, irrigation 
(both for small-scale farmers and large investors), wildlife habitat, and ecotourism. 
For example, there are currently 7807 irrigation beneficiaries out of 26,190 farmers in 
the ATJK woreda using Lake Zeway, Bulbula river and ground water (Interview 
GO3, 2014). This area combines high investment, high population use, big irrigation 
potential, combined with poverty and difficulties in basic services (e.g. electricity and 
drinking water supply). For all investments related to irrigation surface water use in 
the two woredas, please see Appendix 4. 
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Various authors have mentioned the complexity of environmental and socioeconomic 
interrelationships in the region that make it highly vulnerable to both food security 
and natural resource point of view. For example, the region faces problems of 
drought, weak institutions, resource degradation and low agricultural productivity 
(Ayenew, 2007; Biazin & Sterk, 2013, p. 101; Tesfaye, 2008). In the Rift Valley 
Basin specifically, poor management is illustrated by the fact that water withdrawals 
remain unchecked, lack planning, regulation and monitoring, as well as unclear 
authority and enforcement between three organisations: the Basin Authority, regional 
administrations or the Ministries (ODI, 2015). The region also increasingly uses 
irrigated agriculture to rectify its over-reliance on rainfed system (Tesfaye, 2008). 
Interview participants thus conveyed that environmental problems are aggravated 
(e.g. water level decrease, increased saltation, high turbidity, pollution) (Interview 
GO2, GO3 and GO4, 2015). This is due to the fact that water is a resource that is of 
direct interest to the entire population, as well as to government at all levels, the 
private sector and civil society. 
 
2.3. Typology of actors 
This study aims to investigate the power relations and influences amongst actors 
concerning surface irrigation use in the RV-Basin. Therefore it is imperative to 
inclusively map the different actors and their characteristics, presented in a typology 
in Table 2 below. Within these actors there are variations, for example gender, 
education level, locality, age groups, ethnicity. Even farmer categories would have 
different perceptions and mind-sets depending on if they are organised in a 
cooperative group or if they are individual, as seen in the analysis section later. The 
heterogeneity between different state bodies was also be taken into account when the 
state’s role is considered, as they can have conflicting perceptions (Akbulut & Soylu, 
2012, pp. 1147-1148). The complexity of mapping stakeholders’ interests is 
exacerbated due to the multiplicity of levels. Multiplicity of levels brings about 
different capacity (e.g. international or national NGOs would have more resource than 
local NGOs), leverage (e.g. national level government have more power and leeway 
than local government), which is important to see how power is being exercised. 
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Table 2 Typology of actors in the Basin 
No. Actors  Levels/types Characteristics 
1 Smallholder 
farmers 
Individual farmers Mostly impoverished, cereal – 
producing farmers (e.g. wheat, teff, and 
maize) 
Irrigation 
cooperatives 
Groups of farmers sharing resources 
such as irrigation canals and irrigation 
pumps 
2 Government 
agencies 
Dugda and ATJK 
woreda offices 
The lowest administrative unit. 
Examples of departments include 
Irrigation, Agriculture, Land and 
Environmental Protection, Water 
Supply, Investment, and Woreda 
Administration. They provide direct 
support to the people and report to zone 
offices 
East Shewa
7
 zone 
offices 
This office level supervises the two 
woredas in the case study, and are also 
obligated to report to the State offices 
Oromiya state 
offices 
The state offices create policies that are 
in line with the Ethiopian Constitution 
Rift Valley Lakes 
Basin Authority 
(RVLBA) 
A federal level Basin Authority 
mandated to manage the Rift Valley 
Basin 
Federal offices For example, an office is Ministry of 
Water, Irrigation and Energy resources 
of the Federal Government. They assist 
(not supervise) the state level 
departments in terms of budget aid and 
capacity building 
                                                        
7 Dugda and ATJK districts are located in East Shewa zone. Shewa is the name of an old province in Ethiopia 
consisting of three modern zonal administrative regions: East, West and North that are located in the Oromiya 
region. ‘Shewa’ can also be spelled ‘Shoa’ in other literatures. 
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Cooperative unions Semi-autonomous bodies located at the 
woreda level that are created to support 
cooperatives’ work 
3 Civil societies Local NGOs Does implementation in the areas of 
sustainable development, livelihoods, 
gender, conservation and poverty 
reduction 
National/internationa
l NGOs 
Works on less specific topics, partner 
with local offices on projects, usually 
have direct contact with donors 
4 Private sectors Ethiopian private 
companies 
Smaller, less technologically advanced 
horticulture producers 
Foreign companies Bigger floriculture and horticulture 
farms 
Mixed Ethiopian 
state and private 
companies 
Horticulture production 
5 Academics/ 
researchers 
Local government 
research centres 
Produce studies mainly regarding water 
quality, fishery, and soil condition in the 
Basin 
National universities Produce studies, mainly through 
projects and Msc/Phd students, 
regarding the Basin 
Foreign universities Contracted to undertake physical and 
social studies in the RV-Basin 
6 Foreign 
donors 
Development 
cooperation agencies 
Several agencies focus their work in the 
Basin, especially regarding natural 
resource management 
Source: Author, from interview and literature 
 
Various institutional efforts to better the condition of Basin are also present. Apart 
from development projects, there are formal institutions such as the creation of the 
Rift Valley Lakes Basin Authority, the creation of a Basin Master Plan, and a multi-
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stakeholder platforms called the Steering Committee and the Working Group, as 
listed below.  
 
Table 3 Typology of efforts of formal management in the Basin 
No Action Initiator 
1 Creation of Basin Authority Federal government (Prime Minister’s 
Office) 
2 Creation of Basin Master Plan Ministry of Water, Irrigation and Energy 
Resources 
3 Creation of Basin Steering 
Committee and Working Group 
NGO 1 
Source: interview and literature 
 
The government represents the de jure manager of the RV-Basin. As the public 
agencies dealing with the Basin span from the Federal down to the district level and 
also deal with a variety if issues, it is useful to visualise the situation through a flow 
chart (Figure 4). The administrative bureaucracy chart below further shows the 
relationships between government agencies at different levels. Dotted lines show 
coordination mechanisms, whereas full lines show a top-down chain of command. 
They are all in relation to my research area, i.e. regarding surface water irrigation and 
agriculture use and presenting the two selected districts in the Oromiya State. The 
offices in the woreda level not related to the study are excluded, such as water supply 
and wildlife. The flowchart ultimately shows the complexity of the government 
network that manages the Basin. 
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Figure 4 Administrative flow chart of the water management in Rift Valley 
Basin in the two woredas 
 
Source: Author, based on interviews 
 
The administrative map shows the five different woreda offices that deal with water 
use for irrigation and livestock in both Dugda and ATJK woredas. The government 
offices in the woreda level are mostly waiting for directives from the Oromiya state 
government (through the East Shewa zonal government), whereas the other line from 
the Ministry of Water, Irrigation and Enery (MoWIE) denotes that they receive 
training and capacity building. In turn, the MoWIE does not supervise the state 
government as they only assist in budget aid and capacity building (Interview GO6, 
2015). The Basin Administration Directorate is reporting to the Ministry of Water, 
Irrigation and Energy offices in regards to management of all the river basins, which 
in turn reports to the Prime Minister, whom holds the executive power in Ethiopia. 
The Basin Administration Directorate in conjunction with the Ministry oversaw the 
creation of the Rift Valley Master Plan, as well as working closely with the 
autonomous, federal-level body Rift Valley Lakes Basin Authority (RVLBA). 
RVLBA also works with the two state governments, Oromiya and SNNP. It reports to 
High Basin Council  
(chaired Deputy 
Prime Minister 
RVLBA 
MoWIE 
Basin 
Administration 
Directorate 
Oromiya State 
Government 
East Shewa Zone Government 
Offices in ATJK and Dugda woredas 
Woreda 
administration 
Agriculture Investment Irrigation Land and 
environmental 
protection 
Prime Minister 
 21 
the also newly established High Basin Council, which is chaired by the Deputy Prime 
Minister. 
3. LITERATURE REVIEW 
This section presents existing and on-going discussions regarding, first, the 
complexity of managing and studying water resources as also encountered in this 
research. Second, it also looks at popular concepts investigated for its power relations 
in this research, namely the participatory concepts of Integrated Water Resources 
Management (IWRM) and Multi-Stakeholder Platforms (MSPs). Third, literature has 
highlighted the need to identify power relations that are possessed differently by 
stakeholders, e.g. smallholders vis-à-vis donors, which are often neglected in studies. 
3.1. Complexity of studying water and challenges of managing water 
basins 
Water as a resource is challenging to manage. First of all, by nature water transcends 
borders, unlike for example, land. Guo (2012) stipulates that even within borders 
there are differences in administration, topographies, demographics and culture. 
Looking at physical science perspective point of view, geological formation and/or 
geographical distribution of water is not consistent with said administrative/political 
boundaries. However, amongst most water management principles, the widely 
accepted basic principle is that water should be managed on the basis of its natural 
hydrological boundaries (river basin or catchment). It has now become the foundation 
of, for example the European Framework Directive (EC, 2000), although there are 
also different authors mentioning the difficulty of this approach (Tortajada, 2001; 
Swallow, Johnson and Meinzen-Dick, 2001 Cleaver & Franks, 2005). As is the case, 
Wang, Otto, and Yu (2013) stress the importance of looking at both physical and 
social settings in analysing water use, especially for irrigation. They also explain that 
surface water differs from groundwater in terms of monitoring and management. 
 
Authors have argued that policy makers, water managers and researchers should 
recognize the interdependencies of physical and social characteristics, and understand 
that different populations possess different understandings of terminologies such as 
‘catchments’ or ‘watersheds’ (Ison et al., 2007; von Korff et al., 2012). This can help 
in the times of scarcity problems and conflicts amongst water users became increased. 
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Politically, cross-cultural, cross-border area management is always a more difficult 
task as it is more likely that there are people with different perspectives that are 
unable to assess options for appropriate responses to resource management needs 
(Guo, 2012, p. 69).  
 
The different actors involved in water management would add complexity, as 
stipulated by authors such as Ostrom (1990), Dinar, Kemper, Blomquist, and 
Kurukulasuriya (2007) and Meinzen-Dick (2007). Furthermore, management 
comprises of many layers of social, political and economic institutions. Even then, at 
the sub-basin level there are various types of users with their distinct allocations of 
water resources. There are moreover a variety of institutions of which use and 
management rights are exercised, and the overlaps of national, regional and local 
regulatory frameworks (Berger et al., 2006). This is exemplified by Ostrom (1990) 
who posits that there is no single set of rules defined for all irrigation systems, hence 
the difficulty in water appropriation issues. Local water user associations, meanwhile, 
are increasingly becoming more important as their role has been strengthened in 
recent years by decentralization and devolution (Katon, Knox, & Meinzen-Dick, 
2001). 
 
From the discussion above we can see that authors perceive that most cross-border 
water planning and management and studies are riddled with high levels of 
complexity, uncertainty, and conflict (Ackoff 1979, Rittel and Webber 1973 as cited 
in von Korff et al., 2012). There is a need to consider a wide variety of values, 
knowledge, and perspectives in a collaborative decision-making process and 
participatory forms of modelling, planning, and decision-aiding processes in water 
management (von Korff et al., 2012, p. 1). The popularity of participatory, inclusive 
approaches in such a complex system is thus reflected in various institutional 
arrangements and mechanisms as elaborated below. 
 
3.2. Popular concepts in water management and stakeholder participation  
Integrated Water Resources Management (IWRM) is a widely accepted set of 
approaches, that emerged as a result of a search for a new water management 
paradigm (Cleaver & Franks, 2005; Hassing, Ipsen, Clausen, Larsen, & Lindgaard-
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Jørgensen, 2009). It involves a multi-stakeholder conception that encompasses the 
views of water users and other interest groups in the conversation through a 
participatory approach, along with civil society and NGOs for dialogues at the 
national, basin, and local level. This set of ‘common-sense suggestions’ stipulated 
that when scarcity kicks in, the value of water would rise and thus makes it difficult 
for a bottom-up, local management. In such situation (and also in the case where there 
is a large-scale use), it is advised that centrality and consolidation of authority are 
preferable (Hassing et al., 2009, p. 7). The concept has been critiqued for its lack of 
success evidences, for having a reductionist and prescriptive views and for not 
reflecting the world in its heterogeneous ways (Biswas, 2004; Jeffrey & Gearey, 
2006; Medema, McIntosh, & Jeffrey, 2008). 
 
On a different level, multi-stakeholder platforms (MSPs) as envisaged by Warner 
(2006a, 2006b, n.d.) - whom in turn is inspired by the 2000 European Water 
Framework Directive - bring about IWRM at the catchment level to accommodate the 
complexity of uses, the diversity of users, and the dynamics of uncertainty and 
change. The MSP itself is based on the New Public Management thinking according 
to which citizens are critical and judgmental of the public sector for its outputs 
(Osbourne, 1992, as cited in Warner, n.d., p. 10). The citizens are also expected to 
take greater role in co-managing the resources in a new governance arrangement. 
However, the government is still the leading actor, though it is not always decisive in 
making decisions (Warner, n.d.). Warner (n.d.) warns that although MSPs are a 
seemingly exciting and popular idea, it is not a panacea. It has been documented that 
their implementation has fallen short of expectations (Komakech & van der Zaag, 
2013). Such non-authoritarian co-management practices are widely questioned with 
regard to their incentive structures and the general power structure that could lead to 
further marginalization of the interests of some and thus actually hinder the effective 
participation by all (Akbulut & Soylu, 2012, p. 1144). 
 
Other scholars have confirmed that power is usually spread unevenly between 
stakeholders, and at the bottom of the chain are the smallholder farmers. Small 
farmers are a large, spatially dispersed group with heterogeneous interests and limited 
means to education and to communication and transportation infrastructure (IFPRI, 
2005). It makes those in developing countries face numerous obstacles to engage in 
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collective action and defend their interests (IFPRI, 2005). The scarce resource that 
they have made it difficult to engage in long term planning and more risk-taking 
behaviour and thus provide limited engagement in political action, as opposed to large 
farmers and other members of the rural elite (IFPRI, 2005).  This Marxist and 
Neoclassical Public choice approach suggests that small-scale farmers in the food 
crop sector face particular difficulties in influencing agricultural policies, since food 
crop dominate production in poorer and more remote areas where capacity to 
influence policy is low (IFPRI, 2005). 
 
IFPRI (2005) paper notes that in contrast to the smallholders, donor agencies are 
implicitly influential. Donor agencies, especially international financial institutions, 
have also influenced political choices directly through conditionalities - in the 
structural adjustment period, and less so in the country ownership period. The paper 
also mentions that aid often undermines the institutional capacity of the recipient 
country by encouraging corruption, reducing governments’ accountability to their 
citizens, and boosting administrative complexity in response to donors’ reporting 
requirements (IFPRI, 2005). IFPRI (2005) mentions that in the literature on politics of 
agricultural policies in developing countries, the topic of donor agencies role in 
shaping changes to development thinking has received less attention. Future research 
would benefit, the paper argues, from more examination of the impact of donors, aid 
and political regimes on agricultural policies, not only broad economic policies. This 
thesis has then provided a deeper look onto how a donor could have shaped 
government policies in the Basin management. 
 
3.3. The need to study power and institutional bricolage 
This thesis looks in depth into the power relations amongst actors in water 
management. Scholars show that power relations are important but often missed in the 
studies of natural resource management. In a critical study looking at how commons 
are ‘managed’ and ‘clarified’ by mostly ‘Northern common experts’, Goldman (1997, 
p. 3) argues that significant artefacts (e.g. institutions of power) are left behind by 
most development practitioners, which undermines commoners’ rights to control the 
knowledge produced, and ultimately the realm of what is defined as the commons. He 
further contends that it is even more detrimental as this knowledge helps to determine 
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the role of capital, the state, and development institutions on that site (Ibid.). More 
specifically, Goldman (1997, p. 27) insists upon the necessity to understand the 
context, politics and content of struggles over the commons and develop a critical and 
self-reflexive analysis of the institutional practices of development, modernity and 
imperialism and the way powerful agents (e.g. IFIs, developers, NGOs and scholars) 
discursively reduce and rationalize human behaviour to a common metaphor. There is 
a need to look at a more historical, reflective, critical outlook on the relationship 
between the governance of common pool resources and the needs of the marginal, 
poor and often disadvantaged populations that depend on them (Agrawal, 2014). 
Akbulut and Soylu (2012, p. 1145) posit that neglecting power relations in the 
implementation of participatory mechanisms will favour the production, or 
perpetuation of inequities. Garcia-Lopez (2009) also contends that incorporating 
power analysis into institutional analysis provides a much richer explanation. This 
thesis therefore attempted to fill this gap by studying power relations within actors in 
a water basin management. 
 
An approach that integrates the concept of power and actors in institutional 
arrangement is called institutional bricolage. It also studies uneven participation of 
stakeholders in institutions. Institutional bricolage is a post-institutionalist approach 
with their starting point being a wider understanding of the interactions between the 
natural and social worlds, rather than a narrower concern with predicting (and 
improving) the outcomes of particular institutional processes (Cleaver & Franks, 
2005, p. 16; Ribot, Agrawal, & Larson, 2006). Studies have used this concept in 
looking at factors that shape environmental policy-making decisions in the European 
Union (EU), how local actors reshape meanings institutional logics in Post-Soviet 
water governance, how local actors shape the institutional arrangements in a 
community forest in Bolivia and Ecuador and in a communal irrigation in Ethiopia, 
even how global politics can be shaped top-down and bottom up by bricolage (Cartel, 
Boxenbaum, & Aggeri, 2014; Cerny, 2010; De Koning & Cleaver, 2012; Gutu, 
Wong, & Kinati, 2014; Sehring, 2009). 
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4. FRAMEWORK 
Subsequent chapter explores the roles of stakeholders in the Basin management, and 
ultimately aim to answer how all the different actors influence the management of the 
Rift Valley Basin. I did that by utilising the conceptual framework that consists of 
political ecology as an umbrella of the study, institutional bricolage, structural power 
and boundary organisations.  
 
Political ecology is a study that originates politically and intellectually in the 1970s in 
the context of a growing environmental movement and can currently be defined by 
various interdisciplinary and transdisciplinary approaches, and by core disciplines 
such as geography, technology and science, political science, anthropology, resource 
economics, and conservation biology IFPRI (2005). I am aware of the intensive 
debate surrounding its definition and operationalization (Paulson, Gezon, & Watts, 
2003, p. 206; Zimmerer & Bassett, 2003). Yet recent modifications of political 
ecology has developed a richer sense of “political” in relationship to the environment 
and thus make it more comprehensive to use in this thesis (Vayda & Walters, 1999, p. 
168). 
  
The relationships within the framework take into account political ecology’s 
conception. As we can see, political ecology serves as an umbrella of the study. It 
encompasses multiple and conflicting forms of rationality, meanings, identities, 
attention to cultural politics and micropolitics, as opposed to the rational, utility-
maximizing institutionalists (Paulson et al., 2003). Operational concepts used are 
derived from institutional bricolage, of which structural power and boundary 
organisations are located within. Structural power deserves a bigger box as it is used 
more generally throughout the analysis, whereas boundary organization is specifically 
for knowledge production aspect. Lastly, throughout the analysis the question of scale 
is addressed thus its position along the right side 
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Figure 5 Relationships within the conceptual framework 
 
Source: Author 
 
The sections below elaborate on individual parts of the conceptual framework. 
 
4.1. Institutional bricolage 
The concept of institutional bricolage is used to explore how the idea of power 
relations, differences, scales, multi-actors and management of natural resource all fit 
together. This provides a broader framework in which I analyse characteristics within 
institutions and other contextual factors. Institutional bricolage is a process in which 
contestation and negotiation between actors are embedded in a social structure, 
whereby it is a ‘messy’ process of piecing together shaped by individuals acting 
within the bounds of circumstantial constraint (McCarthy, 2012, p. 620). Institutions 
are shaped by historic factors, by the power relations that prevail in social life and by 
worldviews, which incorporate the roles of the human and natural resources (Cleaver, 
2002; Lecoutere, 2011).  
 
Institutions are engineered by multi-actors and individuals (Cleaver & Franks, 2005, 
p. 4). Individuals are not always rational and only economic resource appropriators, 
and instead they are ‘conscious and unconscious social agents, deeply embedded in 
their cultural milieu but nonetheless capable of analysing and acting upon the 
circumstances that confront them’ (Cleaver, 2002). This is inline with political 
ecology’s notion to look at multiple and conflicting identities and rationality 
(Giddens, 1984; Douglas, 1987 as cited in Cleaver, 2002). People’s identities for 
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institutional purposes should reflect complex social, livelihood identities, multiple 
motivations, and changing priorities over their life courses. It should not only look at 
just whether a person is just an ‘irrigator’ or ‘pastoralist’ (productive identities), but 
also whether that person is a ‘leader’ or a ‘woman’ (social roles) (Paulson et al., 
2003). Not only that every person has multiple identities, it needs to be recognized 
that and ‘bricoleurs’ – actors shaping the process of institutions - are likely to possess 
more authorative resources than others. Overlapping social identities mean that people 
may call on a variety of attributes (e.g. economic wealth, specialist knowledge or 
official position, to kinship and marriage, or personal characteristics such as 
eloquence, strength and honesty) to justify institutional position or influence. Looking 
at the complexity of actors in this study is imperative to see if the formal 
institutionalism created had emphasised particular identities and roles. Emphasizing 
particular identities in turn could have reproduced and also reinforced or amplified 
social divisions amongst actors (Cleaver, 2002).  
 
A basin, particularly the Rift Valley, encompasses a large area with diverse kinds of 
water users. The study thus looks at the importance of scale. Larger scales of 
interactions and linkages have been proven to be more difficult to manage (Cleaver, 
2002). For example, the size of the basin makes it difficult for local level institutions 
to engage actors/water users in further away place to participate, and not to mention 
that different users engage with water differently. Even at a small scale, great 
variations can exist in local perceptions and judgments on what is considered good 
and/or bad (Cleaver & Franks, 2005). This is a physical scale problem. As also 
denoted in political ecology questions of access, it is important to address the problem 
in physical scale. Scale problem can lead to problem of access in which water users 
are not able to access and reach out to other parts of the Basin. The problem of scale 
and access thus leads to exclusion to the management (Penna-Firme, 2012). As also 
mentioned in political ecology, multiple levels of analysis are therefore needed to 
look at a complex resource such as the Basin.  
 
4.2. Structural power 
As mentioned in the elaboration of institutional bricolage concept, power relations are 
laden in the human interactions that engineer institutions. To investigate the power 
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relations within the RV-Basin management, I thus used the concept of structural 
power, as there was no direct, individual coercion. Power is conceptualized as social 
relations that are built on the asymmetrical distribution of resources and risks. 
Structural view understands power as forces above and external to the individual 
(e.g. beyond a person’s race, gender, class) that operate unacknowledged to influence 
people and their behaviour (Cleaver & Franks, 2005, p. 14). Power is located in the 
interactions among, and the processes that constitute, people, places, and resources 
(Raik, Wilson, & Decker, 2008, p. 734). Politics, then, are found in the practices and 
mechanisms through which such power is circulated, and as individuals negotiate 
power relations (Paulson et al., 2003, p. 1). As we look specifically into power of 
water users in the RV-Basin, it fits into political ecology’s notion to look at political 
ramifications of environmental alterations (Paulson et al., 2003; Raik et al., 2008). 
Issues of power and politics in natural resource management include access, control, 
rights, ownership and use (Franklin, n.d.). 
 
This concept is useful to explain the implicit social-structural production of consent 
and norms in the Basin. This means that a status quo is maintained, but not through 
the actions of individuals rather the practices and rituals of groups and institutions 
(Raik et al., 2008). These rituals and practices are comprised as societal forces that 
shape individual preferences, and this shaping process works to justify and maintain 
current systems of power (Ibid.). The maintenance of current systems of power thus 
makes a social control that make individuals ‘only strive for those things that the 
“defenders of status quo” want them to strive for, thus there is no conflict or 
rebellion’ (Ibid.). A clear example of this view is its use in the justification for 
encouraging local participation of ‘disadvantaged local people’ based on their social 
position (Dryzek, 1997; Bryant, 1998; Brechin et al., 2003 as cited in Raik et al., 
2008). However, social stratifications show that government officials and non-
governmental organization (NGO) staffs are more ‘powerful’ than local, resource-
dependent people, thus the emphasis for more participatory approaches to natural 
resource management (Ibid.).  
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4.3. Boundary organisations 
The last concept used in this thesis is boundary organisations, which look at the 
practices of institutions of groups pertaining knowledge creation as a form of 
structural power. Boundary organisations are institutions or organizations that can 
control the coproduction of environmental science by forming linkages between 
science and policy networks (Raik et al., 2008). It allows us to see how, where, and by 
whom common norms are established in networks of science and policy. Using this 
concept, I have shown how knowledge, science-policy networks and management 
efforts in the RV-Basin are defined and enforced through the actions of specific 
organizations or political actors (Forsyth, 2003, p. 136). This is especially relevant as 
previously said in the Introduction section; literature on the management of the Basin 
is scarce. 
 
In boundary organizations, knowledge about the biophysical world cannot be 
separated from social influences, and particularly from how society is clustered and 
organized (Forsyth, 2003, p. 141). It is an important backcloth to the influence of 
political action on the generation and legitimization of scientific knowledge (Forsyth, 
2003, p. 132). When scientific statements are seen to be politically neutral and 
authorative, they may reinforce the original concerns and framings, and imply these 
are universally applicable to all people. To see such things it is imperative to identify 
and analyse both ‘actors’ that influence environmental science, and the ‘structures’ 
and institutions that constitute environmental science (Ibid.). ‘Actors’ within 
environmental science are therefore conditioned by existing structures such as 
overriding discourses or accepted rules about what constitutes environmental science 
(Ibid.). 
 
To conclude this chapter, I have therefore used: First, institutional bricolage to study 
institutions through scale, power relations, and individuals that ‘engineer’ them. 
Going more specific, I used structural power to see individuals’ interactions within 
the institution and how they influence one another, and third, the concept of boundary 
organisation to see how production of knowledge is crucial in shaping the overall 
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discourse. The three concepts above are furthermore bounded and reasoned by 
political ecology. 
 
5. METHODOLOGY 
The methods elaborated below are chosen as part of the whole methodology that uses 
constructivism, in which the world is constantly produced and reinterpreted by social 
research subjects. In accordance to the constructionist view, I am more concerned 
with the processes through which discourses depict reality rather than with whether 
they contain true or false statements (Forsyth, 2003). As an outsider with a pre-
understanding of the concept I moreover tried to have an objective analysis of what 
people constituted as ‘truths’.  
 
For this purpose of this research, I used a qualitative case study method (multiple data 
collection method), i.e. overt observation, interviews (primary data) and document 
review (secondary data) (Creswell, 2014, p. 200). As such, a case study is 
generalizable to propositions in the theory, not to the populations (Yin, 2009). Thus, 
the amount of interviews collected cannot be justified in terms of statistical 
generalization, yet it suffices for capturing the perceptions to analyse with the theory.  
Most of the primary data were obtained through an overt fieldwork that spans on and 
off between the months of November 2014 – January 2015. I collected 27 interviews, 
with 52 participants - some of the activities were group interviews.  
 
I ‘entered’ the field through the help of a partner organisation (as I was doing a 
separate internship in an organisation at that time), and got introduced to local actors, 
i.e. government officials, civil societies, private sector and smallholders through them. 
I used the service of a known gatekeeper-translator from the area. As I was introduced 
to the field by a partner organization which themselves provided some suggestions, I 
am aware of my own background, positionality and reflexivity, and the fact that I 
could have indirectly shaped the research and discussion tilting possibly in favour to a 
certain side. This awareness is thus crucial in a constructivist view in which impartial 
materials and analysis were sought and done as much as possible. Due to the political 
climate in Ethiopia, I have also decided to present my respondents and country names 
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in pseudonyms - without omitting their characteristics and institutions – all of which 
can be seen in Appendix 2 and 3. 
 
5.1. Data collection methods 
I used several techniques in order to uncover the power dynamics of the communities 
surrounding the Basin, dynamics of knowledge production and characteristics of 
relations amongst actors. The utilisation of multiple tools is also beneficial for 
triangulating the data. The semi-structured interviews and group interviews served to 
answer the issues that I intend to investigate in, reconfirm/contradict the theory and 
also to uncover previously unthought-of topics. All of the interviews were semi-
structured, as it opened greater flexibility in allowing asking other questions and 
receiving other types of response. In this study I utilised several maps, which serve 
the purpose of analysing and understanding in more depth the relations of natural 
resources location to social perceptions. The map has allowed me to explore different 
dimensions of the phenomenon under study: For example, through the help of the 
study kebele map (Figure 3), I uncovered that the more remote and geographically far 
smallholders are from government offices and the surface water source, the less likely 
they will be involved in the management of the RV-Basin. This finding also includes 
the private sector to some extent, unless the company has considerably larger 
economic means. 
 
To study the relations of difference and power within the myriad of local actors, I 
inserted intersectionality in a broad sense in my questions list: class (richer more 
prominent farmers are more involved in the governance of the water?), ethnicity 
(some ethnic groups might be more privileged than others), gender, position in 
institution, and religious dynamics. As Forsyth (2003, p. 104) mentions, it helps to 
identify and study multiple spheres and social axes of power. Political ecology 
recognizes the plurality or positions, interests and rationalities in relation to the 
environment (Paulson et al., 2003, p. 210), and to explore that aspect I also created a 
typology of actors involved in the water governance of the Basin as presented in the 
Background section. Several minor issues and ethical dilemmas ensued, i.e. taking 
smallholder’s time off during post-harvest season, concern whether to give them 
monetary or in-kind compensation for their time, and defending my interview criteria 
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from an otherwise a ‘ready-made’, ‘model’8 farmers’ answers. The last part is critical 
to note especially in power relations study, in which it was the opposite of what I 
want to look at. The list of questions is presented in the Appendix section. 
 
Purposive sampling is used, as some issues need the knowledge that possibly lies 
within specific people (Paulson et al., 2003). I especially used maximum variation 
sampling in which I tried to capture a wide range of perspectives to see the 
phenomenon from all the different angles, regarding water management in the basin 
amongst different actors, places and levels. The three largest groups had been the 
smallholder farmers, the government officials and the private sector. I started with the 
most obvious, ‘suitable’ cases, which are the farmers’ associations that are located in 
the same kebeles as the large-scale plantations, as well as local government officials. 
This is in order to test whether the geographical proximity affects their level of 
interactions and power dynamics. This was contrasted with the ones that are 
geographically far, and/or less endowed. Overall I interviewed 29 smallholders 
through two focus group discussions and four group interviews. For government 
officials, I interviewed eight people. I made sure to look at multiple levels of officials 
(district, regional and national) who are one way or another involved in negotiating 
the water governance in order to provide contrast. I interviewed four NGO workers 
and six private sectors. The criteria for them were that they needed to be in the 
geographical boundary of the research, and worked on issues and/or extract water 
from the lake and rivers for their business. Furthermore I also interviewed known 
stakeholders such as universities and research centres, business associations, a foreign 
embassy/donor all that work(ed) or have interest in the RV-Basin. To avoid potential 
bias, purposive sampling was based on the theoretical framework concepts that I 
utilised (multi-level, multi-actors, and geographically different), information from 
similar studies, as well as through elicitation from experts in the field. 
 
5.2. Data analysis 
After data collection, I start the process of coding as part of the analytical tactic. I first 
made sense of the text and image data. Coding is a method to organise and group 
                                                        
8 Model farmers or model cooperatives are those that are more successful financially than the rest. They appear in 
various literatures on the Rift Valley Basin. They were also the ones being offered as samples as seemingly being 
chosen to portray positive things. 
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similarly coded data (or called Nodes in the NVIVO software) into categories or 
‘families’ because they share some characteristic (Ragin & Amoroso, 2011). They are 
arranged under several categories, which included some more detailed sub-categories. 
For example, data coded as “Data about the natural resources” were categorized under 
the major heading ‘Means of acquiring knowledge’, which in turn had several more 
refined sub-categories called ‘Conduct own study’, ‘Observation’, ‘Reading articles’, 
‘Talk in town’ and ‘Workshops’. These are all part of a hierarchal coding scheme 
(Bryman, 2012, p. 418). I looked for patterns that correspond to one of these: 
similarity, difference, frequency, sequence, and/or correspondence (Saldana, 2009). 
After these, the major categories were compared with each other and consolidated in 
various ways that progresses towards the thematic, conceptual, and theoretical 
(Saldana, 2009). The coding went hand-in-hand with data collection and the write-up 
of findings. Between this going back and forth, I also ‘winnowed’ the data, focusing 
on some of the data and disregarding other parts of it (Saldana, 2009). This part is to 
aggregate data into small numbers, and using computer is an easy way to quickly 
locate passages. Since I used a case study approach I also inserted a detailed 
description of the people, places and event in a setting (Creswell, 2014; Saldana, 
2009). Themes emerged from the categories serve as the major findings of the study, 
as well as the complex connections between themes that were also formed (Creswell, 
2014, p. 195). Generalizations about the patterns were analysed, as well as how they 
compared and contrasted with existing literature, especially for a case study like mine. 
Lastly I had presented the results through both text and visuals like tables and figures 
to make it easier to read. 
 
I used an iterative process using deduction (identified a phenomenon, suggested 
aspect to study and connected to previous existing research) and induction (find 
patterns in the data collected and test preliminary explanations) in my analysis. My 
analysis is multi-level. I feel this is the most appropriate type of analysis due to the 
nature and topic of my research, which is Basin management. This entails looking at 
representations of the people from the two woredas (which includes the private sector, 
civil societies, small holders, and government officials), regional and national level, 
as well as national organisations (e.g. government officials, university, research 
centre). Aligned to the political ecology concept, the governance problem is not only 
‘local’ and need to be contextualized in a region or even nation-wide level. Forces 
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driving environmental and institutional change operate on multiple levels and they 
interact in multidirectional causality (Creswell, 2014, p. 200). 
 
5.3. Reliability and validity 
It is important to ensure reliability and validity in a qualitative research such as this to 
eliminate bias and increase my ‘truthfulness of a proposition about some social 
phenomenon’ (Golafshani, 2003, p. 604). Efforts on ensuring reliability and validity 
of this research have been motivated by the constructivist approach. The 
constructivist view that reality is changing whether the observer wishes it or not 
indicates the potential existence of multiple construction of realities (Golafshani, 
2003). Accordingly a constructivist study values multiple realities (Ibid.). Therefore, 
to check the accuracy of findings I employed several procedures as suggested by 
Creswell (2014): First, I triangulated different sources of data (e.g. document reviews 
and seeing ‘facts’ from different people). I also used different methods of gathering 
data to acquire the diverse and multiple realities (e.g. interviews, focus groups, 
observation and desk reviews). Second, I used more description so that the result 
becomes realistic and rich. Third, as I have elaborated on the personal reflection 
above, I am aware of my biases that could skew the result of analysis. Fourth, I also 
inserted discrepant views that could differ from the general views. Likewise to be 
reliable, I had also documented the procedures from entering the field, data collection 
until analysis, as well as double-checking transcription and coding so that the 
meanings do not differ Creswell (2014, p. 202). 
 
6. ANALYSIS 
This section analyses the power relations amongst actors in the management of the 
RV-Basin. It is structured through exploring the roles of the three biggest actors 1) 
private sector, 2) smallholders, and 3) government officials in influencing the water 
management of the Rift Valley Basin. Each part is answered using the concepts of 
institutional bricolage, structural power and boundary organisations. As mentioned in 
the preceding chapter, I use pseudonyms of participants when presenting citations to 
protect their identity.  
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6.1. How do private sector play a role in the RV-Basin management? 
Investigating the role of the private sector in the RV-Basin for water management is 
imperative as they represent the side with vital economic interest in the water (and 
land) use. I argue that in the water management of the Basin, the private sector varies 
in participation, knowledge, interaction and opinions. Furthermore, I argue that as an 
institution, partnership between an international company and a donor play a key role 
in knowledge production and shaping the environmental discourse of the Basin. This 
is complemented by the fact that economic interests have taken over the Basin, 
causing the bricolage appear ‘smooth’. This in turn managed to create a status quo 
between strategic partners, making potential conflict amongst actor non-existent. 
 
I argue that the private sector is not a homogenous entity and that interactions among 
stakeholders depend upon authorative resources possessed, i.e. specialist knowledge 
and economic wealth. This is evident through interviews with the private sector, in 
which first, interactions amongst themselves about water use and management in the 
RV-Basin were uniformly not existent, as well as with smallholders and NGOs 
(Interview PS3, PS4, PS5 and PS6, 2014). Meanwhile, their interactions with 
government officials vary, in which an international company that possessed their 
own lab testing and drip irrigation technology claimed that government officials visit 
not only to collect revenue but also ask for sponsorship and training (Interview PS5, 
2014). A businesswoman (located in the upper-stream of Lake Zeway) also received 
extra visits especially as the government encouraged female entrepreneurs (Interview 
PS6, 2015). A local company located furthest from the government office in Zeway 
Town explained that conflicts between them and smallholders usually occur during 
dry seasons and that only then the government would come (and solve the problem). 
(Interview PS4, 2014). From the discussion above, it can be seen that interactions 
with the government, the de-jure manager of the Basin, also grow less with larger 
scale and distance. This will prove to have an implication in the management of the 
RV-Basin in general, in the sense that private sector involvement and participation are 
also less. 
 
Though the private sector as a whole might not seem to have much stake or interest in 
water management based on the above, one is arguably different. As institutional 
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bricolage concept mentions, an actor could call on its variety of attributes to justify 
institutional influence or position (Cleaver, 2002). One company, incidentally one of 
the biggest land leaser in the region, is a case of that notion. PSA Company, a 
floriculture company hailing from Country A,
9
 was notoriously blamed as being one 
of the causes of the environmental degradation in the RV-Basin (Interview D1, 2015). 
The negative reputation prompted Embassy A to intervene through development 
projects: 
The Central Rift Valley in specific has a huge environmental problem… It is 
pretty clear that it was because of them [PSA Company] also, because the 
pollution exists after the plants were established.... There was a real need for 
this [project in the CRV Basin]… A study was commissioned two years ago. 
98% pollutants seem to come from there [PSA Company] (Interview D1, 
2015). 
 
Thus concerns that the company might be blamed for the deteriorating water 
condition in Lake Zeway, and that it could affect negatively the business had 
prompted the project. A researcher from Country A also confirmed this by mentioning 
that his university was chosen to ‘provide knowledge and fact to the anticipated multi 
stakeholder platform or policy dialogue’, ‘improve poverty condition’ and also more 
importantly for ‘water management related issues especially in regards to investors 
from Country A’ (Interview A3, 2015). The researchers, in turn, were chosen by 
Embassy A in Ethiopia due to close ties with Ministry of Agriculture of Country A. 
The outcomes of the (research) projects were publications, ‘more informed decision-
making’, and ‘capacity improvement of local stakeholders through training on 
specific topics’, and the creation of a multi-stakeholder platform for the management 
of the Basin (which is organised by NGO 1) (Interview A3, 2015). Parallel to the 
research project, Embassy A also established NGO 1 (Interview D1, 2015). NGO1 at 
that time was tasked to conduct, among many, Country A-funded development 
projects in the RV-Basin based on the research project outcome. NGO 1 in turn 
funded various local NGOs in the area as local partners, as well as disseminating 
information from the research project (Interview NGO1, NGO2, NGO3 and NGO4, 
2014).  
 
                                                        
9 There are a limited number of foreign companies in the RV-Basin. I have chosen to provide anonymity to avoid 
shaming a particular country. Here the code ‘A’ represents one particular country, which is the same country in the 
subsequent use of Embassy ‘A’. 
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We can see from the illustration above that protection of economic interests drove the 
creation of knowledge through boundary organisations. Actors that became involved 
were the seemingly politically neutral researcher from Country A, and NGO 1, whom 
disseminated the knowledge. It further confirms boundary organisation’s notion that 
scientific statements when seen to be politically neutral and authorative, may 
reinforce the original concerns and framings, and imply these are universally 
applicable to all people (Cleaver, 2002). It is even crucial as capacity, management 
and knowledge are scarce in the area, and that there was a real need.
10
 Moreover, 
literatures have addressed that donor could also influence political choices of 
government (Forsyth, 2003). It is confirmed by my findings that the donor did exert 
some power as they fund projects, and the view that they could give strategic 
suggestions regarding private sector engagement and collaboration to higher-level 
government officials (Interview D1, 2015). The implication of this is that certain 
actors that are more equipped knowledge-wise, financially and in networks are closer 
to the de-jure manager of the RV-Basin, the government. 
 
Coming back to the result of the research project, it did not confirm directly that 
contamination was from PSA Company, however it does prescribe measures such as 
implementing the widely accepted IWRM and multi-stakeholder platforms (MSPs) 
(Interview A3, 2015). At the same time, the government are already shaped by 
existing discourses on water management such as the Integrated Water Resource 
Management (IWRM) and Multi-Stakeholder Platforms (MSPs) as elaborated in the 
regulatory framework in the Background section earlier (please see Table 1). From all 
these Country A-funded projects, the outcomes have been a land use map that is 
utilized by the local government, a plan to construct of a wetland near the farms, and 
last but not least organizing the multi-stakeholder platform that purports to include all 
relevant stakeholders engaged in water use and planning in the Basin (Interview 
NGO1 and DO1, 2015). This further shows a high uptake and close engagement with 
the local NGOs and the government, denoting a successful boundary organisation.  
 
                                                        
10 A local government research institute located in Zeway Town that was interviewed mentioned that, apart from 
basic physical parameter and water quality studies (that are also assisted in part by civil society CSD), they do not 
really conduct in depth studies. The regional government needs to approve their research proposal, only then they 
could go ahead with research. Respondent further said that government officials (especially local ones) never ask 
them to do research, and that the country is “not demand-driven type” (Interview A1, 2015). 
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Circumvention of knowledge, meanwhile, has helped to create a status quo. This is 
exemplified by the fact that the government for its part has not been able to shed light 
on the contamination problem. A woreda official elaborated on the situation: 
Contamination from PSA Company is guessed, but no real scientific proof. 
When the water sample is taken to Addis Ababa University, they say there is a 
diffusion or eutrophication of the water. But when we ask from who, they did 
not say the name of the toxic and if it is from PSA Company. It might be that 
because it is politically sensitive, because it is a huge investment. Around 
60,000 people are employed and it brings foreign currency (Interview GO2, 
2014). 
 
This shows that structural power lies in mutual economic interests between an 
important company and the government, which were exercised through both the 
production and circumvention of knowledge.  
 
In this section we have seen how the private sector in the RV-Basin vary in scale, 
distance and authorative measures. As a result, their influences vary to the water 
management of the RV-Basin from none to very influential. One company, aided by a 
donor, in particular had called upon a variety of authorative resources such as 
knowledge creation and economic wealth to justify its institutional position in the 
Basin management more than others. During the power exercise, the academics and 
NGOs also became involved, the former as knowledge creator and NGOs to 
disseminate knowledge. The acceptance of this politics is easier as government 
officials (i.e. de-jure manager of the Basin) were already shaped by popular 
discourses that exist in boundary organisation such as the IWRM and MSPs. The 
acceptance such uncontested knowledge (and the subsequent development projects) in 
such a crucial part of institutional arrangement of the Basin is so embedded that 
people would find it difficult to be consciously and discursively (IFPRI, 2005).This 
confirms the structural power concept in which the production of social-structural 
consent and norms work to justify and maintain current systems of power favouring to 
a certain side (i.e. one private sector) and open conflict among actors non-existent 
(Douglas, 1987 as cited in Cleaver, 2002). Lastly, it is shown that both production of 
knowledge (engineered by Embassy A) and the circumvention of knowledge by the 
government confirms boundary organisation concept that stipulates knowledge 
especially about biophysical world cannot be separated from social influences (Raik 
et al., 2008). 
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6.2. How do smallholders play a role in the RV-Basin management? 
To answer how actors influence the management of the RV-Basin based on their 
respective power, it is imperative to look at a group of actors that represent the 
majority water user group that directly depend upon the surface water of the RV-
Basin for their livelihoods, the smallholders. I argue here that some, though embedded 
in a cultural milieu, could still analyse though not act upon the circumstance that 
confront them (Forsyth, 2003). This is due to the physical scale problem that they 
confront, which is shaped by rituals and practices of groups that make them only 
strive for those things that the ‘defenders of status quo’ want them to strive for.  
 
I argue that smallholders did not influence the water management in general as they 
do not participate much in any complain mechanism, nor possess consistent 
interaction about the management with especially the government officials. In the 
sample woredas and kebeles that I have taken, smallholders did not interact much 
with other actors, except from the occasional visit by officials or NGO workers 
(Interview SH1, SH2, SH3, SH4, SH5, and SH6, 2014). As a group of people directly 
handling the water resource and thus having more immediate physical knowledge of 
the water resource, based on the interviews, the farmers claimed that they were never 
asked about what they think on how to better manage the RV-Basin (Interview SH3 
and SH5, 2014). This is significantly different if the farmers are included in an 
irrigation cooperative group, especially if the group is a ‘model’ cooperative 
(Interview SH2 and SH6, 2014). The model cooperatives feel that not only they are 
given more attention by the government and the cooperative union, but also feel that 
they would be taken into account whenever they try to give suggestions (Interview 
SH2 and SH6, 2014).  
 
Though smallholders recognise the environmental degradation happening in the RV-
Basin condition, their knowledge were based on observations and/or word-of-mouth 
alone Interview SH2, SH3, SH5, and SH6, 2014). This is difficult to prove due to the 
lack of up-to-date impartial research in the area, and due to the limitations of my own 
observations.
11
  Most farmers, in turn, admit to not initiate many complains to the 
                                                        
11 During the short fieldwork, my observations have shown the contrary, that wildlife thrives normally in the Lake 
and it is still able to be a source of livelihood (e.g. fishing). Having said that, indeed the color of the lake is brown, 
indicating a high sedimentation and that being nearer to the floriculture farm, the water has a tint of green algae-
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government (except when it is very vital such as competition of water during the dry 
season), as they feel it is rather useless (Interview S1, SH3 and SH5, 2015). 
Therefore, they only could complain about technical issues, e.g. water quantity, and 
not management issues per se. One group of smallholders even conveyed that as they 
did not use surface water and the fact that their village is located further from 
government offices, they did not have interaction at all with some government offices 
(Interview SH1, 2015). It confirms the physical scale problem that exists in the RV-
Basin in which it is difficult for local level institutions to engage actors/water users in 
further away place to participate, and which eventually leads to problem of inclusion 
in the management (Cleaver, 2002). The example above then confirms the findings by 
(Cleaver & Franks, 2005, p. 14) which mentioned that small farmers are a large, 
spatially dispersed group with heterogeneous interests and limited access to education 
and to communication, and that makes their influence to policy minimal. 
 
In the paragraph above we have seen the disconnect that exists between farmers and 
public agencies created a sort of unfamiliarity and a reticent situation from the former. 
Furthermore, the prevailing view amongst all interview participants is that the 
government should be the one initiating and taking charge of the water management, 
making the government indeed ‘powerful’ in their eyes (Interview SH1, SH2, SH3, 
SH4, SH5 and SH6, 2015). In general the norm is to accept government policies and 
practices without much questions. This indicates that the current management is not 
very participatory, and that potentially important views from the largest water user 
group in the RV-Basin is neglected. Therefore, it confirms structural power’s view 
that status quo is maintained by shaping individual preferences so that there is no 
conflict or rebellion(Raik et al., 2008) .  
 
Although the norm is not to question or give a lot of suggestions, or otherwise act 
upon anything, evidences presented above have proved that closer-connected 
smallholders (i.e. the model cooperatives) were able to critically analyse the situation 
and power play at hand (especially between the government and the private sector) as 
stipulated in institutional bricolage’s conception of individuals (Cleaver, 2002). 
Another powerful actor in the model cooperatives’ eyes is the international private 
                                                                                                                                                              
like layer, which I am not able to identify what.  
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sector. The two cooperatives interviewed perceived that the private sector perhaps 
also influenced the government in some ways as the government supports them 
(Interview SH2 and SH6, 2014). For example, they knew the bigger ones like PSA 
Company did not report to local governments, but directly to the federal government 
(Interview SH2, 2014). One cooperative even went as far as saying that the private 
sector did not like cooperatives especially because they have large land (Interview 
SH2, 2014). The cooperatives said that at the moment there is no problem but perhaps 
in the future water conflict could arise due to new water demand from a new branch 
of PSA Company being established in a nearby downstream location (Interview SH2 
and SH6, 2014). It is important to note that the two cooperatives are located in the 
same village as PSA Company, thus the added awareness to the company’s activities. 
Despite being aware of the situations, given that the ‘power’ does not reside within 
their hands, there seems very little that small holders can do to influence the water 
management in the RV-Basin, due to the nature of governance and structural 
hierarchy in the country. 
 
Looking at heterogeneity and complexity of actors under institutional bricolage is 
imperative to see if the formal institutionalism (i.e. management) had emphasised 
particular identities or roles, which may have amplified social divisions (Cleaver, 
2002). Heterogeneity was difficult to find within the groups of smallholders in the 
selected kebeles: Female farmers were rarely participating (as well as entrepreneurs, 
academics, NGO workers and government officials) hindering a clear gendered 
perspective, even though women consists of a little less than 50% of the population in 
the two woredas (Cleaver, 2002). The ones that participated in my interview sessions 
did not convey much knowledge about water and its management (Interview SH1, 
SH4 and SH5, 2014). Clear differences exist on the area of management and 
knowledge, in which those that belong to ‘model’ cooperatives would be able to state 
more regulations and management issues (Interview SH2 and SH6, 2014), whereas 
normal cooperatives would have limited knowledge (Interview SH3 and SH5, 2014), 
and farmers without cooperatives would have the least knowledge and exposure 
(Interview SH1, 2014). Ethnicity is a sensitive topic in Ethiopia in general for some 
due to historical reasons, but at least in the woredas there were no identified ethnic 
clashes. Age did not seem to be biased as participants were ranging from young adult 
to elderly age (19-63 years old). From this illustration I argue that social divisions 
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exist and could potentially be amplified in the RV-Basin, as knowledge and 
participation seem to circulate only amongst men and those involved in cooperatives. 
This confirms institutional bricolage: that participation of actors such as the 
smallholders in the RV-Basin is shaped by power relations and institutions. They are 
moreover legitimized through a variety of processes including the use of symbolic 
resources, multiple authority structures (i.e. cooperatives and several level of 
governance) and devices borrowed from the state (Cleaver & Franks, 2005). 
 
The main findings in this section are that smallholders are not a homogenous entity 
and that their knowledge on the management varies. Physical scale problem as 
stipulated in the model under institutional bricolage exists. Furthermore, smallholders 
were mostly not included in the management and it created a reticent situation, but 
still felt that the government is the key ‘powerful’ actor. Their knowledge is limited to 
observations and word-of-mouth, and claimed to never having any session of 
information sharing with the government. I argue then that status quo is maintained 
by shaping the group’s knowledge and preferences so that there is no conflict or 
rebellion, as stipulated in structural power concept. Another ‘powerful’ actor in some 
of their views was the private sector and their activities. This indicates awareness to 
the exercise of private sector’s structural power, in which there were powers that 
operate unacknowledged visibly to them. Though smallholders are clearly not a 
homogenous entity, providing clarity on their complexity was not an easy task. 
Therefore, I argue that despite their being the largest number of water user, the 
smallholders have not been influencing the water management of the RV-Basin, much 
due to their own unorganised complexity. 
6.3. How do government officials play a role in the RV-Basin 
management? 
The RV-Basin is, by convention, managed by the government spanning from the 
woreda level, up until the federal level. In order to meet the overall aim of the paper 
of seeing how each actors influence the management of the Basin, it is thus 
imperative to look at how the government play a role.  I argue here that, first, it needs 
to be established that there was no prior institution formally governing the Basin other 
than the newly established Rift Valley Lakes Basin Authority (RVLBA), making the 
new management still unsteady and complex. Second, there were variations in 
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opinions depending on the scale and level of governance (i.e. between the woreda and 
higher levels). Third, it is found that what some government officials constitute as 
participatory is different from actual participation from all relevant stakeholders, 
thereby constituting a form of effort on its maintenance of power. Fourth, it is evident 
as stipulated by boundary organisation concept; the government’s importance of 
knowledge-creation in the RV-Basin was shaped by ‘structures’ namely its economic 
interests. 
 
Looking at previous examples of efforts on basin management in Ethiopia is 
important to see how institutions have shaped RV-Basin management. Prior to the 
RVLBA, the federal government created two other Basin Authorities which are also 
located in economically and politically important areas (CSA, 2012).
12
 They were 
created as a ‘tool to implement and manage economic sector’s need for IWRM’ 
(Abebe, 2014). However, both my interview and literature have indicated that they 
have not been working properly, and cannot be set as an example for the newly 
established RVLBA (Interview GO7, 2015; ODI, 2015). The RVLBA and its 
supervisory body, also the newly created River Basin High Council, also lacked 
capacity thus hindering effective work (ODI, 2015, p. 11). Therefore here we can see 
that government’s effort of managing the RV-Basin has been unprecedented with best 
practices and by itself also plagued with problems, making this new formal institution 
unsteady and complex. 
 
I argue next that a clear exercise of structural power is evident in RVLBA’s strong 
emphasis on ‘collaborative and participatory’ mechanisms for its work (Interview 
GO8, 2015). Upon review of an official document - apart from various government 
institutions in the local, regional and federal level - it seems that opinions of 
smallholders and water user associations and the private sectors have been gathered 
(Interview GO8, 2015; GIRDC, 2010b; ODI, 2015). However, the prevailing 
discourse in my interviews with key officials are that the focus of the RVLBA is to 
collect water fees from the private sector operating in the RV-Basin, gain knowledge 
                                                        
12 First, Abay Basin Authority is managing Abay River Basin, located within three regional states. It has almost 
50% of the country’s runoff, and contributes to 62% of the water inflow to the Aswan Dam in Egypt (Awulachew 
et al., 2007; EC, 2000). Second, Awash Basin Authority manages Awash River Basin that is located within five 
regional states and two administrative councils. It is one of the most utilised rivers in the country for source of 
drinking water, hydropower, industrial consumption, irrigation and disposal of wastewater (Authority, 2012).  
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from the academic sector and financial resource from NGOs (Interview GO7 and 
GO8, 2015). It can be seen then that what constitutes as real participatory in the Basin 
planning is the inclusion of selective strategic stakeholders, and in turn does not 
include other large group of water users such as the smallholders, or the pastoralists. 
In fact previous studies have highlighted the fact that the term participatory might 
very much be driven by the need to meet donor’s requirements (Keeley Scoones, 
2000; Harrison, 2002 as cited in ODI, 2015; Warner, n.d.). Norms such as IWRM and 
multi-stakeholder platform in water management planning is very embedded that 
people find it almost impossible to be conscious and discursively critical of them. It 
seems that IWRM in Ethiopia to have become ‘an end in itself’ (Komakech & van der 
Zaag, 2013). Therefore we can see that such ‘participatory mechanism’ an actually an 
exercise of structural power that attempts to create maintenance of power and control 
(Raik et al., 2008). In the end, this participatory processes then seems to only 
make/change individuals to “only strive for those things that ‘defenders of the status 
quo’ want them to strive for so that there is no conflict or rebellion” (Raik et al., 
2008). 
 
To understand how governments could influence the water management of the RV-
Basin, it is important to understand the variations within their perceptions shaped by 
differences in scale and level. I have confirmed a study by Penna-Firme (2012) that 
also show that even at a small scale, great variations can exist in local perceptions and 
judgments, in this case amongst the woreda officials and also between them and the 
federal officials. Woreda officials can be said are more practical and implementation-
oriented. One government official in the woreda level believed that they are merely 
facilitating, implementing and providing info downward and upwards (Interview 
GO4, 2015). He further said, “our problem is not planning, but implementation. We 
have to put all these things [i.e. regulations and plans] to the ground, and then 
betterment perhaps can happen” (Interview GO4, 2015). However, the same official 
also said that initiative should come top-down, denoting pessimism of his own 
capability to create change (Interview GO4, 2015). It is likely due to persistent 
hindrance from higher levels, as illustrated from the quote below: 
In principle the key role lies with the woreda level but there is no 
empowerment. When they try to do something, there is interference from the 
central government. They do not have full power. Woreda level actually sees 
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all the mess, not the Authority and the central government (Interview PS5, 
2014). 
 One government official thought that they have some power to influence, especially 
if backed by scientific knowledge (Interview GO2, 2015). Whereas the offices that 
directly relate to irrigation in the woreda level thought that they are the government 
officials that are in power to decide, at least small-scale irrigation, private sector water 
use, production, and their relationship with farmers (Interview GO3 and GO1, 2015). 
However, the similarity is that local government officials did not know or hear about 
initiatives such as the new Basin Authority, the RVLBA (Interview GO1, GO2, GO3, 
and GO4, 2015).  
 
In the federal level, meanwhile, the RV-Basin is both lucrative and that it is very 
political as it spans between two regional states, Oromiya and SNNP. Competition for 
water and tax fees from the private sector is potential reasons. For example, in the 
creation of the RVLBA, decision was made in the Prime Minister’s office, denoting a 
highly political matter (Interview GO8, 2015). Appointment of its head was also done 
through political affiliations (Interview GO8, 2015). In general government officials 
in the federal level were more confident about their complains and suggestions being 
heard (Interview GO7 and GO8, 2015). They also had more strategic and political 
thinking, as they conduct assessments of the basin-wide sectors, planning for short, 
medium and long terms, and assigned roles for every stakeholder they deem relevant 
in the management of the Basin (Interview GO7 and GO8, 2015). Earlier the woreda 
official complained about not enough implementation, whereas in the federal level 
they blamed it on lack of financial resources and at the same time put importance in 
creating more up-to-date plans, studies on the RV-Basin condition, and gain 
knowledge in general from academic forums and workshops (Interview GO7 and 
GO8, 2015). 
 
The two paragraphs above thus illustrated the different perceptions amongst levels of 
government officials regarding the management due to the influence of scale, which 
make institutional bricolage within government officials a ‘messy’ process. This 
indicates that there is no uniformity on perception on how to solve issues. Not only 
that, it is known that water resources planning and management are done in a 
fragmented way across governance levels and sectors in the Basin Authority (Cleaver, 
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2002). For example, water management is inseparable from land, however land is a 
regional responsibility, while Basin Authorities are established as a federal structure, 
and their mandate only covers water management (ODI, 2015). Moreover, regional 
governments such as the Oromiya government, have their own agendas and may 
develop water resources without the knowledge of the RVLBA and without following 
the Master Plan (ODI, 2015).
13
 Looking back at the government flowchart in the 
Background section (Figure 4), it can be seen that there are a lot of duplicities and 
unclear reporting schemes within just one regional state. The complexity of the 
management is illustrated by a quote from an academic: 
In the federal level, implementations of the regulations are not so good. 
Decisions are being made in the higher level are especially for investment 
issues. They say they do not have evaluation guidelines. Environmental 
impact assessments are just recently being looked at. There is also the question 
of investment vs. regulatory office. Basin authority [like the RVLBA] can give 
regulations but so can the Oromiya government, and the watershed agency 
located in the ministry (Interview A2, 2014). 
 
Thus we can concur that the condition was, and still is, categorized as a social vacuum 
where power relations are defined by who has the more authority. 
 
To conclude, the main findings of this section are that, first: historically there were no 
best practices that the government could take as an example for the RVLBA. Second, 
I have also shown that the government’s ‘participatory mechanism’ is an actually an 
exercise of structural power that attempts to create maintenance of power and control. 
Finally, the different perceptions amongst government officials of the management 
shaped by the different scales make institutional bricolage within government 
officials themselves a ‘messy’ process. Complexities and intricacies within the 
reporting systems also posed problems for the management. 
 
  
                                                        
13 There seems to be an outdated policy (i.e. 1999 Policy) that is not aligned with current development strategies 
(i.e. GTP). No discussion has been made to update the soon expired WSDP in 2016. In theory, the allocation of 
water for different uses and users are mentioned in Master Plans, however they are also outdated and do not reflect 
the actual needs and demands from various sectors and levels (Hemel & Loijenga, 203). 
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7. CONCLUSION 
The purpose of this research has been to explore and contribute to knowledge 
regarding power relations between the different actors (i.e. smallholders, private 
sector, the public sector, academia, donor, and civil societies) and institutional 
arrangements, that are involved in the surface water management of a common pool 
resource located in the Rift Valley Basin (RV-Basin). I specifically studied the 
districts of Dugda and Adami Tulu Jido Kombolcha located in the regional state of 
Oromiya in Ethiopia. 
 
The thesis utilised concepts that operate under the umbrella of a political ecology 
study, namely institutional bricolage, structural power and boundary organisations. 
Moulded within political ecology’s ideas of multiple and conflicting forms of 
meanings and identities, institutional bricolage looked at processes in which 
contestation and negotiation between different actors operating in institutions within 
the RV-Basin are shaped by power relations and social structure. Structural power, 
meanwhile, looked at how power relations are between the different actors in the RV-
Basin water management. Lastly, boundary organisations looked at a specific exercise 
of structural power by certain actors in the management, namely knowledge-creation. 
I used multiple data collection method, i.e. individual interview, group interviews, 
focus group discussion, desk reviews of documents and observation.  
 
The main findings were as follows. Based on elaboration of actors’ perceptions, it can 
be seen that there are varying worldviews, knowledge and interactions amongst 
themselves. Actor’s multiple identities present complexity in worldviews, and each is 
not homogenous. Though the research has successfully explored heterogeneity 
amongst actors, it has not been taken into account in the actual water management of 
the RV-Basin. This presents a situation of ‘false’ smoothness of the institutional 
bricolage processes by not incorporating plurality of actors’ point of views. There was 
not much of a process of negotiation and contestation between actors, resulting in an 
arguably inadequate institutional solution as it fails to recognise the depth of social 
and cultural fabric of decision-making and co-operative relations. Local concerns are 
not (yet) balanced with those in the larger scale. Elaborating further using structural 
power concept, we can see almost predictably that yes, smallholders in these districts 
still feel less influential and just ‘accept’ the situation. However, my findings have 
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also shown that most of the other local actors feel the same as exemplified by some 
government officials, local Ethiopian companies, local NGOs and research centre. 
Regarding participation, management process has not been very participatory, and 
even if they did, it was more ad hoc basis (e.g. from a foreign funded project). 
Limitations to engage women and other marginalized groups (i.e. pastoralists) existed.  
 
Regarding the use of knowledge in the management of the Basin, boundary 
organization has played a key role, not only about private sector operation, but 
especially in institutionalising participatory approaches in the form of Integrated 
Water Resource Management (IWRM) and multi-stakeholder platforms (MSPs) for 
the Basin. These widely accepted concepts were not difficult to adopt by the 
government as they are also shaped by existing discourses to use IWRM and MSPs. It 
is aptly written by Foucault’s position on power and knowledge: “the exercise of 
power perpetually creates knowledge, and conversely, knowledge constantly induces 
effects of power” (1980, p. 52). The lack of knowledge and communication, and 
exclusion in general, regarding the new initiatives would even further them away 
from being involved in the management. By not recognising plurality on identities, 
knowledge and participation, formal institutionalism has also reinforced social 
divisions and emphasise particular identities and roles, making distance amongst 
actors even more prominent. 
 
As mentioned in the Introduction section, I aimed to provide answer as to how power 
dynamics of the various actors influence the management of water of the Rift Valley 
Basin. Situating my findings, a previous study has looked at institutional problems 
within basin authorities and watershed management in Ethiopia, yet limited in power 
dynamics within actors in the local level (ODI, 2015). This thesis has also attempted 
to merge previously stand-alone concepts under a political ecology umbrella. Through 
the analysis and findings, therefore my original contribution to this field of knowledge 
has been to fill a gap in the empirical and theoretical literature; through this 
institutional study that addresses power relations amongst actors at various level; 
focusing on the dynamics in an economically, environmentally, and politically 
sensitive river basin.  
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The power dynamics of the various actors in influencing the management of the RV-
Basin are as follows: the smallholders are a heterogeneous entity that do not have 
much influence on the RV-Basin water management as they lack authorative 
resources and face issue of scale, therefore they mostly wait for initiatives from the 
government. Second, the local NGOs also do not have much influence on the Basin 
except when they are equipped with specialist knowledge and financial resources 
from donors, as in the case of NGO 1 who work closely in shaping both the 
environmental policy and knowledge. Third, it has been identified that the academics 
play a significant role, especially paired with NGOs and the private sector in shaping 
the knowledge discourse. Fourth, the private sector is another heterogeneous entity 
that do influence how the RV-Basin is managed, depending on how much 
authoritative resource like how much tax they pay and specialist knowledge that they 
have. Fifth, the most influential actor is the government, as even though they are also 
heterogeneous, they play a key role in decision-making and implementation through 
their authoritative resource, and they are however influenced a lot by economic 
benefits offered by the private sector, which often seem to overshadow best water 
management of the RV-Basin.  
 
Power relations within surface water use and management in the RV-Basin are 
intricate and extensive. To be able to generalise my findings to the whole Basin, a 
further study covering and comparing the situation with the other regional state is 
recommendable. A further, more comprehensive study is necessary to capture power 
relations amongst actors with different ethnicities and administrative boundaries. Not 
only that, it is essential to couple it with an impartial biophysical study on the RV-
Basin whose results can be taken up to construct proper measures against further 
degradation of the lakes and rivers. This is especially relevant to prevent a complete 
dry up of lakes and watersheds as is the case of Lake Haromaya in the Harar region of 
Ethiopia, and many other cases of drying up lakes in Africa. As an Ethiopian proverb 
says, “you think of water when the well is empty.” It is time to respond to the water 
management challenges of our time through inter-disciplinary applied research that 
emerged as a result of the intertwinement of biophysical studies and analysis in the 
social realm. 
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Appendix 
Appendix 1. List of interview questions 
 
Company 
 
 
Organisation’s information 
 What is your business (what do you produce)? 
 How many staff? 
 What is your capital? 
 Why do you choose this place for business? 
 How was the process of being granted business permit (especially regarding 
land)? 
 
Water use 
 Where is your water source, Meki river or Lake Zeway or…? 
 How much water do you withdraw (in m3 or liter, per day/week/month)? 
 When do you withdraw water? 
 What method do you use to withdraw the water (motor pump or…)? 
 What system do you use for irrigation? 
o Furrow/flood     
o Drip 
o Sprinkler 
 
Regulation 
 Do you pay for using water? 
 
Conflict 
 Is there any water use conflict so far? For example, with surrounding farmers 
 Is there any mechanism to resolve conflict? 
 
 
Interactions, participations and perceptions 
 What organisations/individuals do you interact with usually for, in general and 
specifically for water use? 
o How is the relation of this organisation with the local government 
(kebele and woreda)? And with the zonal or regional level? 
Date: …  Place of interview:  …    Date/time: … 
 
Information about the Interviewee 
Name: 
Gender: 
Age: 
Ethnicity: 
Occupation/organisation: 
Location/village of organisation: 
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o How is the relation of this organisation to the private sectors? 
o How is the relation of this organisation to the civil societies? Do you 
know or acquainted with any? 
 What is the purpose of the interaction? How often? 
 What are usually the results of the interaction (positive or negative)? 
 How important do you think the interaction with these 
organisations/individuals? 
 Do you have any conflict of interest with other organisations (e.g. rivalry?) 
 
 
 Do you participate in any forum/platform/network/institution/training 
regarding the water management (of Lake Zeway or Meki)? 
 What is the purpose of the forum? 
 How did the participation start (were you invited or you initiated yourself)? 
 What is the frequency of the participation? 
 Is important to participate here? 
 Why do you participate? 
 Do you think that you achieved your personal/organisational objective in 
joining this forum? 
 
 
 Do you know any projects from foreign donor that do interventions for the 
betterment of the water in Meki river and/or Lake Zeway? 
o If yes what are they? 
 What do you think about these projects? 
 What do you think about the operation of the private sectors? 
 What do you think about the operation of the civil societies? 
 Since you can remember, do you think there have been improvements since 
they come and operate? 
 
 
Knowledge about the Basin 
 What do you know about the present condition of the Meki river and/or Lake 
Zeway? 
 Where do you get information about the Basin (or the Lake or the River)? 
o Government 
o Research centres 
o Academic publications (which university?) 
o TV/radio 
o Observations  
 Do you need to know more information about the Basin (or the Lake or the 
River)? 
 Do you think there is a water management the Basin? 
o If yes, how is it being managed 
o If not, how do you think it should be managed? 
 
Power 
 Whom do you convey complains about the water conditions to? 
 Do you think your complains are being heard? 
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 Do you think you have enough influence or voice to give suggestion regarding 
the management of the Basin? 
 Do you think you have power overall in the community? 
 Who do you consider has the key role in influencing the water management? 
 How do you think the government (kebele and woreda level) is influencing the 
use of water resources in this woreda/region? 
 How do you think the private sectors are influencing the use of water 
resources in this woreda/region? 
 How do you think the civil societies are influencing the use of water resources 
in this woreda/municipality? 
 In what issues regarding water do you think is possible to bring about change 
in this municipality? 
 What needs to be done? Who is supposed to do so?
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Government Office 
 
Organisation’s information 
 What is the objective of the office? 
 How many farmers in the woreda, and how many irrigation beneficiaries do 
you have? 
 
Water use 
 What is the irrigation potential in Dugda woreda? 
 How much is for investment? 
 Which water source (Meki river or Zeway lake)? 
 What method to withdraw the water? 
 What system do farmers use for irrigation? 
o Furrow/flood     
o Drip 
o Sprinkler 
 
Regulation 
 Are there any water extraction regulations? 
 If yes, what are the regulations? 
 Are they enforced? 
 
Capacity and issues affecting the Office 
 What is your organisation’s main achievement? 
 What is your organisation’s main difficulty? 
 What can be improved to increase your capacity? 
o More resources 
o More training 
o More involvement in the water management 
 
Conflict 
 Is there any upstream-downstream conflict? 
 Is there any mechanism to resolve conflict? 
 
Interactions, participations and perceptions 
 What organisations/individuals do you interact with usually for, in general and 
specifically for water use? 
Date: …  Place of interview:  …    Date/time: … 
 
Information about the Interviewee 
Name: 
Gender: 
Age: 
Ethnicity: 
Occupation/organisation: 
Location/village of organisation: 
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o How is the relation of this organisation with the local government 
(kebele and woreda)? And with the zonal or regional level? 
o How is the relation of this organisation to the private sectors? 
o How is the relation of this organisation to the civil societies? Do you 
know or acquainted with any? 
 What is the purpose of the interaction? How often? 
 What are usually the results of the interaction (positive or negative)? 
 How important do you think the interaction with these 
organisations/individuals? 
 Do you have any conflict of interest with other organisations (e.g. rivalry?) 
 
 
 Do you participate in any forum/platform/network/institution/training 
regarding the water management (of Lake Zeway or Meki)? 
 What is the purpose of the forum? 
 How did the participation start (were you invited or you initiated yourself)? 
 What is the frequency of the participation? 
 Is important to participate here? 
 Why do you participate? 
 Do you think that you achieved your personal/organisational objective in 
joining this forum? 
 
 
 Do you know any projects from foreign donor that do interventions for the 
betterment of the water in Meki river and/or Lake Zeway? 
o If yes what are they? 
 What do you think about these projects? 
 What do you think about the operation of the private? 
 What do you think about the operation of the civil societies? 
 Since you can remember, do you think there have been improvements since 
they come and operate? 
 
 
Knowledge about the Basin 
 What do you know about the present condition of the Meki river and/or Lake 
Zeway? 
 Where do you get information about the Basin (or the Lake or the River)? 
o Government 
o Research centres 
o Academic publications (which university?) 
o TV/radio 
o Observations  
 Do you need to know more information about the Basin (or the Lake or the 
River)? 
 Do you think there is a water management the Basin? 
o If yes, how is it being managed 
o If not, how do you think it should be managed? 
 
Power 
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 Whom do you convey complains about the water conditions to? 
 Do you think your complains are being heard? 
 Do you think you have enough influence or voice to give suggestion regarding 
the management of the Basin? 
 Do you think you have power overall in the community? 
 Who do you consider has the key role in influencing the water management? 
 How do you think the government (kebele and woreda level) is influencing the 
use of water resources in this woreda/region? 
 How do you think the private sectors are influencing the use of water 
resources in this woreda/region? 
 How do you think the NGOs are influencing the use of water resources in this 
woreda/municipality? 
 In what issues regarding water do you think is possible to bring about change 
in this municipality? 
 What needs to be done? Who is supposed to do so? 
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Water User Associations/Irrigation Cooperatives/Farmers 
 
 
Organisation’s information 
 What is the objective of the Cooperative? 
 How many members does it have? What are the characteristics of the 
members (crop production, level of capitalisation, household number, etc.)? 
 Why do farmers become a member of your Cooperative? 
 
Water use 
 How much water do you withdraw? 
 When do you withdraw water? 
 What method do you use to withdraw the water? 
 What system do you use for irrigation? 
o Furrow/flood     
o Drip 
o Sprinkler 
 
Regulation 
 Do you regulate water extraction activities? 
 If yes, what are the regulations? 
 If a member breaks the rule, is there any sanctions? 
 Are they enforced? 
 
Capacity and issues affecting the Irrigation Cooperative 
 What is your organisation’s main achievement? 
 What is your organisation’s main difficulty? 
 What can be improved to increase your capacity? 
o More resources 
o More training 
o More involvement in the water management 
 
Conflict 
 Are there any upstream-downstream conflict? 
 Is there any mechanism to resolve conflict? 
 
Interactions, participations and perceptions 
 What organisations/individuals do you interact with usually? 
Date: …  Place of interview:  …    Date/time: … 
 
Information about the Interviewee 
Name: 
Gender: 
Age: 
Ethnicity: 
Occupation/organisation: 
Location/village of organisation: 
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 What type of interaction? 
o Verbal     
o Meeting 
o Written 
 What is the purpose of the interaction? How often? 
 What are the restrictions/difficulties of the interaction? 
 What are the incentives for the interaction? 
 What are usually the results of the interaction? 
 How important do you think the interaction with these 
organisations/individuals? 
 Do you have any conflict of interest with other organisations (e.g. rivalry?) 
 How is the relation of this organisation with the local government (kebele and 
woreda)? And with the zonal or regional level? 
 How is the relation of this organisation to the private sectors? 
 How is the relation of this organisation to the civil societies? Do you know or 
acquainted with any? 
 
 Do you participate in any forum/platform/network/institution regarding the 
water management (of Lake Zeway or Meki)? 
 What is the purpose of the forum? 
 What is the purpose of the participation? 
 How did the participation start (were you invited or you initiate yourself)? 
 What is the frequency of the participation? 
 Is important to participate here? 
 Why do you participate? 
 Are there any difficulties? 
 Are there any commonalities in terms of the values that you share with this 
forum? 
 Do you think that you achieved your personal/organisational objective in 
joining this forum? 
 Have you agreed or disagreed with the forum/platform/network/institution? 
 How was the disagreement settled? 
 
 Do you know any projects from foreign donor that do interventions for the 
betterment of the water basin/resources? 
o If yes what are they? 
 What do you think about these projects? 
 What do you think about the operation of the private sectors? 
 What do you think about the operation of the civil? 
 Since you can remember, do you think there have been improvements since 
they come and operate? 
 
Knowledge about the Basin 
 What do you think is the state of the condition of the Basin (or the Lake or the 
River)? 
 Where do you get information about the Basin (or the Lake or the River)? 
 In what form is the information? 
o Verbal 
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o Poster 
o Meeting  
 Do you need to know more information about the Basin (or the Lake or the 
River)? 
 Do you think you know enough about the Basin condition (or the Lake or the 
River)? 
 Do you think there is a water management the Basin? 
o If yes, how is it being managed 
o If not, how do you think it should be managed? 
 
Power 
 Whom do you convey complains about the water conditions to? 
 Do you think your complains are being heard? 
 Do you think you have enough influence or voice to give suggestion regarding 
the management of the Basin? 
 Do you think you have power overall in the community? 
 Who do you consider has the key role in influencing the water management? 
 How do you think the government (kebele and woreda level) is influencing the 
use of water resources in this woreda/region? 
 How do you think the private sectors are influencing the use of water 
resources in this woreda/region? 
 How do you think the civil societies are influencing the use of water resources 
in this woreda/municipality? 
 In what issues regarding water do you think is possible to bring about change 
in this municipality? 
 What needs to be done? Who is supposed to do so? 
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Appendix 2. List of individual interviewees 
No 
Itv 
Code 
Pseudonym Age Gender Organisation Sector Domain Ethnicity 
1 
GO1 
Government 
official 1 
29 M Irrigation Office 
Development 
Authority 
Government 
official 
Local Oromo 
2 GO2 Government 
official 2 
27 M Land and 
Environmental 
protection office 
Government 
official 
Local - 
3 
GO3 
Government 
official 3 
29 M Irrigation office Government 
official 
Local Ethiopian 
4 
GO4 
Government 
official 4 
41 M Team of natural 
resource 
management 
Government 
official 
Local - 
5 
GO5 
Government 
official 5 
40 M Oromiya 
Investment 
Commission  
Government 
official 
Regional Oromo 
6 
GO6 
Government 
official 6 
53 M Human Resources 
Directorate, 
MoWIE 
Government 
official 
Federal Tigray 
7 
GO7 
Government 
official 7 
52 M Basin 
Administration 
Directorate, 
MoWIE 
Government 
official 
Federal Amhara and 
Oromo 
8 
GO8 
Government 
official 8 
44 M Rift Valley Lakes 
Basin Authority 
Government 
official 
Federal SNNP 
9 
NGO1 
NGO worker 
1 
41 M NGO1 Civil society Multinational Foreigner 
10 
NGO2 
NGO worker 
2 
60 M NGO2 Civil society National Not 
important 
11 
NGO3 
NGO worker 
3 
43 M NGO3 Civil society Local Oromo 
12 
NGO4 
NGO worker 
4 
38 M NGO4 Civil society Local  Oromo 
13 
A1 
Academic 1 39 M Researcher and 
director 
Academic Local - 
14 
A2 
Academic 2 - M Addis Ababa 
University 
Academic National - 
15 
A3 
Academic 3 52 M Agronomist and 
former project 
leader 
Academic Foreign Foreigner - 
A 
16 
PS1 
Company 1 40 M ENBLA Private sector National Foreigner - 
A 
17 
PS2 
Company 2 41 M ENBLA Private sector National Foreigner - 
A 
18 
PS3 
Company 3 36 F Owner  Private sector Local Oromo 
19 
PS4 
Company 4 32 M Farm Manager Private sector Local Oromo 
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20 
PS5 
Company 5 
 
30 M Production 
manager, 
Private sector Foreign - 
21 
PS6 
Company 6 30 F Plant scientist Private sector Local Ethiopian 
22 
D1 
Donor 1 - M Food security, 
Development 
Cooperation 
Association, 
Embassy A 
Donor National Foreigner -
A 
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Appendix 3. List of group interviews 
Itv 
code 
Name Village Age Gender Position Crops 
SH1 
 
Farmer 1 Kemu 
Garbi 
 
29 M Farmer maize, wheat, 
harcot beans and 
sorghum 
 
 
Farmer 2 37 M Farmer maize and 
wheat 
Farmer 3 26 F Farmer Maize and 
wheat 
Farmer 4 25 F  Maize, 
sorghum, and 
wheat 
Farmer 5 28 F Farmer Maize and 
wheat 
Farmer 6 27 M Farmer Maize and 
wheat 
Farmer 7 30 M Farmer/security guard 
at PSA 
Maize and 
wheat 
Farmer 8 20 F Farmer  
Development 
agent 
30 M Development agent  
SH2 Farmer 9 Haleku 32 M Farmer/Cooperative   
Farmer 10 36 M Farmer/Cooperative   
Farmer 11 - M Farmer/Cooperative   
SH3 Farmer 12 Tuchi 
Dembel 
63 M Farmer/Cooperative   
Farmer 13 63 M Farmer/Cooperative   
SH4 
 
Farmer 14 Shubi 
Gamo 
27 M Farmer Cabbage, 
papaya and 
maize 
Farmer 15 55 M Farmer Maize 
Horticulture 
specialist 
27 F Horticulture specialist  
Farmer 16 35 M Farmer Papaya, 
cabbage, green 
beans 
Farmer 17 25 M Farmer Papaya, green 
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beans, wheat 
and maize 
Farmer 18 28 M Farmer Green beans, 
cabbage, 
papaya, onion, 
maize and 
wheat 
Farmer 19 26 F Farmer Maize  
Farmer 20 20 F Farmer Maize  
Farmer 21 19 F Farmer Papaya and 
cabbage 
SH5 Farmer 22 Oda 35 F Farmer/Cooperative Tomato, onion 
and cabbage 
Farmer 23 35 F Farmer/Cooperative  Tomato, onion, 
and cabbage 
Farmer 24 50 F Farmer/Cooperative  Tomato, onion 
and cabbage 
SH6 Farmer 25 Golba 32 M Farmer/Cooperative   
Farmer 26 24 M Farmer/Cooperative   
Farmer 27 55 M Farmer/Cooperative   
Farmer 28 37 M Farmer/Cooperative   
Farmer 29 27 M Farmer/Cooperative   
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Appendix 4. List of private sector utilising surface water irrigation in 
Dugda and ATJK woredas 
No. Company  Year est.  Hectares  Woreda Source Production 
1 La Salle 
Agro 
Industry 
2003 60 ha Dudga Lake 
Zeway 
Teff, 
cereal, 
vegetables, 
fruits 
2 Makia 
Private 
2003 10 ha Dugda Lake 
Zeway 
Vegetables 
and cattle 
fattening 
3 BGI 
Ethiopia 
2000 450 ha ATJK Bulbula 
river 
Winery 
4 Sher 
Ethiopia 
1998 550 ha ATJK Lake 
Zeway 
Cut flowers 
5 Segel 1998 975 ha ATJK Bulbula 
river 
Banana 
papaya 
6 ETCO 1998 93 ha ATJK Bulbula 
river 
Papaya 
onion 
7 Mustafa - 100 ha ATJK Bulbula 
river 
Crops 
8 Federal 
Prison 
- 128 ha ATJK Lake 
Zeway 
Fruits, 
corns and 
onions 
 
Source: Interview GO1 and GO2 (2014) 
